Introduction
Talking about fundamentalism nowadays is neither unusual nor occasions any surprise,for the term is widely and even increasingly usedinthe scholarly world and beyond it with reference to many and quite diverse contexts,r eligious and non-religiousalike.Having originally been coined by external observers as aterm of opprobrium to describe ac onservatives urge among American Protestants opposing liberal trends in the USA in the early 20 th century,the use of this term was later significantly amplified. It thus came to describe numerous groupsi n other religions (e.g.I slam), without losing its original significance and connotation. Thelater growing politicization of fundamentalist movements and their effortst og ain firm footholds in society were also thematized in this context. Nonetheless, the term has oftenb een criticized as being too generic and allencompassing, hence lacking analytical abilities,precision and usefulness.
1 This is 1S ee Antes 2000. because many related phenomena are lumped together as fundamentalist, afact obscuring or neglecting their potential idiosyncrasies and differences. It is true, though, that this term has been long established in scholarly and non-scholarly usage,thus it will make little sense to try to drop it or replaceitbyanother, more pertinent one.Asiswell-known, terminological issues are quitehard to deal with. Suggesting anew term as an alternative to fundamentalism(e. g. radicalism, extremism) will not automatically solve the related problems and may even contribute to more confusion and misunderstandingsthan before. Therefore,ithas been conclusively argued that it is better to try to clarify the alreadywidely used and established term throughamore adequatetypology or otherwise.
2 This has been attempted in recent decades as aw ay to overcome previous difficulties with this term, although the categories and the criteria used for this purpose vary significantly.F or example,Martin Riesebrodt arguedfor a necessary distinction between fundamentalisma nd traditionalism, first because fundamentalism may includen ew elements as beingt he result of at ransformational process,and second because it constitutes amilitant, mobilized traditionalism. To this purpose,hereferred to KarlMannheimsmodel of transition from traditionalismt oc onservatism. 3 In addition, otherg eneral questions regarding this phenomenon need further reflection and, if possible,c larification: does fundamentalism simply reflect aparticular individual attitude,orisitembedded in aspecific social milieu and concomitant movement?What are the differences between fundamentalist and otherp rotest movements?I st hereafundamentalism avant la lettre? Should fundamentalism be viewed solely as athreat and a grave danger?Should the term be applied solely to religious phenomena or more broadly to the non-religious domain?W hat are the relations between fundamentalism and modernity as awhole? 4 Another issue worth discussing in the presentcontext is the existence of some terms parallel to fundamentalism that have also been in use and that also contribute to the above terminological complications. Perhaps the most prominent of these terms is integrism, which has also been used to describe certain fundamentalist-like phenomena. This is especially the case in the related Frencho r Italian literature (intØgrisme/intØgralisme or integrismo/integralismo). Characteristically enough, while the term "fundamentalism"was more commonly used for the Protestant case,t he term "integrism" was mostly used with regard to related phenomena withinR omanC atholicism, whereas both terms have also been used with regard to Islam. This signifiest hat certain differences may be located between the variousChristian traditions with regard to such phenomena, despite some undeniable commonalities. 5 These and other particularities and 2S ee Riesebrodt 1990, p. 18 . 3S ee ibid., pp.215-216. 4S ee Makrides 1994a. 5S ee Alexander 1985. difficulties become more apparentw hen one tries to translate the above terms into foreign languages and convey their meaninginanadequateway. 6 Now turning my attention to the Orthodox Christian world, which is the main focus of the present article,i ts hould be acknowledgedt hat we also find phenomenahere which fall under the range of significanceofthe above terms and in most cases are characterized as,orcalled, fundamentalist. In various texts of mine, written in differentl anguages,b oth the term "fundamentalism" 7 ,a sw ell as the term "integrism" 8 have been used to describe and analyze related phenomena. Other scholars dealing with Orthodox Christianity have also done the same, yet from different standpoints and perspectives. 9 In fact, several of the general characteristicsofsuch movements (Protestant and otherwise) appear to be found mutatis mutandis among theirOrthodox counterparts.However, in the scholarly literature on these phenomena the Orthodox Christian case has generally not been taken into account. Fore xample,i nt he ambitious,f ive-volume The Fundamentalism Project (1991 Project ( -1995 of the AmericanAcademy of Arts and Sciences, coordinated by Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby, the relatedO rthodox phenomena are conspicuously absent.
Yet, from al ater perspectivea nd takingi nto consideration the numerous specificities and particularities of the Orthodox Christiancontext, my preference lies with usingamore neutralterm to talk about such phenomena. Similar caveats have also been expressed with regard to the othert erms mentioned above.F or instance,a lthough there have been interesting attempts to transform terms like fundamentalism into sociological categoriesw ith potentially universal applicability as indicatingavery specific form of religious revival, 10 its application as an appropriate term to designate and describe specific phenomena within Roman Catholicismhas been questioned. 11 Furthermore,weshould seriously consider the fact that, generally speaking,t herei sascarcity of stricto sensu fundamentalist movements in Europe vis-à-vis the USA or the rest of the world. 12 This has been attributedt om any causes; for example, to the influence of the Enlightenment upon Christianity in Europe.This lack of fundamentalism is also considered as a feature underlining Europese xceptionalism regarding its own particular religious evolution. 13 However,t he above observations are grounded more in the 6R egarding the related Greek case,see Makrides 1994b . 7S ee Makrides 1991 . 8S ee Makrides 2003 . 9C oncerning the term "fundamentalism", see Morris 1998; Uliakhin 2003; Hovorun 2016 ;concerning the term "integrism", see Yannaras 1990, p. 31; Lossky1 992; Kitsikis 1994 . 10 See Riesebrodt 2000 , pp.269-271. 11 See Casanova 1994 . 12 See Davie 2002 , p. 24. 13 See Davie 2000a religious history of Western Europe. If we take alook at Orthodox Eastern and South Eastern Europe,w ed or ealize the existence of numerous protest groups and movements exhibiting significant similarities to American Protestant and Islamicfundamentalism, as well as to Roman Catholic integrism.
Nevertheless,s ince we are dealing with the very specificO rthodox religious and cultural milieu, it would be more adequatetodescribe the phenomena under consideration with another term. It is for this reason that Ihave opted for the term "rigorism" 14 ,which is again not unknowninthe related ample literature,despite its rather limiteduse. 15 Eschewinganessentialist definition of this term, it is,first, am ore inclusive one covering various phenomena with family resemblances. More importantly,i tm ay also includep henomena that historically precede the first appearance of the term "fundamentalism". In fact, this is what particularly appliestothe Orthodox case.Second, it allows the flexible use of elements from varioustheoretical schemesinorder to do justice to the particularities of the given case.Third,itismore neutral,since other terms have quite aloaded history,having been associated in the past with as pecific religion or culture,afact that often obscures their analytical usefulness.H ence,i ts use with regard to Orthodox Christianityi sp rincipally unproblematic. Fourth, it underlines some main features of such phenomena;n amely the uncompromisingp ositions,t he intransigence,the radicalness and the militancy of certain hardliners in upholding their own views, often being antagonistic towards the surrounding culture and the leadership of their religion. Fora ll these reasons,t his term seems to be more appropriate and fittingtothe Orthodoxsituation, where the cleavage between the church hierarchy and the rigorists is usually evident.
To be more specific, for various reasonsi ti si nadequate to simply place the RussianOld Believers (from the late 17 th century onwards) or the various groups of Old Calendarists (from the early 20 th century onwards) in different contextsboth having to do with astrong attachment to ritualism and established liturgical traditions -under the category of fundamentalism. Thefirst case especially has a much longer history than the term "fundamentalism" and modernr elated phenomena. Moreover, this term fails to bringtolight some common and key features of these Orthodoxp rotest movements;f or example,t heir strong anti-Western stance,aswell as their care for and rigor in interpretingand upholding the highly treasured Orthodoxy as the sole right faith in the entire world. Asimilar problem may be detectedw hen referring to Scripturalism (a strict adherence to al iteral interpretation of the Bible), which can be observedboth among Orthodox rigorists and Protestantfundamentalists.Apparently,both cases share many common characteristics in this regard, yet the differencesb etween them are again conspicuous and cannot be made clear if we were to talk indistinctlyo fa" Biblical fundamentalism"
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.Orthodox Scripturalism hasagain amuch longer history than the Protestant one and is further connected with several other key issues (e.g.the role of tradition), which are lacking in the Protestant counterpart. By introducing the term "rigorism" thus,m yi ntention is neither to solve the aforementioned terminological problems, nor to propose it as the ideal one to be usedgenerally in relatedcontexts.Itisbasically about amore neutral and appropriate term, which can be applied to various cases including the Orthodox one and conceptualized accordingly.
Who are the Orthodoxrigorists?
Thebearers of Orthodoxrigorism do not represent asingle and uniform unit, but can be located across awide spectrum of people with variedprovenance,social status and orientation. These may act individually and independentlyinspecific contexts,b ut in other cases they may be organized in respective movements, organizationsand groups,thus enhancingtheir mobilizationpower, visibility and effectiveness.The main problem, however, is that they cannot be always identified as such, for they may also appear and act in broader settingst hat include other groupsand actors,aswell, and sometimes non-religious ones.The chief issue here is to locate the differentiae specificae of Orthodox rigorism. Forinstance,toexpress anti-modern views or exhibit an anti-Western stancen either renders someone nor agroup automatically rigorist.
This holds, at first, true for the church hierarchy and selected members of it who may profess such views or may entertainc loser elations with rigorists.I nm ost cases,such rigorists can be distinguished from the official church hierarchy and the mainstream Orthodox believers.H owever, no absolute and strict demarcation line can be drawn between them,asthe boundaries remaininmany cases fluid and easily penetrable.The phenomenon of churchhierarchs supporting rigorists out of various considerations and for numerous reasons is not out of the ordinary.The church hierarchies in predominantly Orthodox countries,mostly in Eastern and South Eastern Europe,try to keep abalanced and diplomatic position in society, not least becauseoftheir close relationswith the respective states.Y et, the phenomenon of someb ishops expressing extremev iews and having close contacts with or even supporting Orthodoxr igorists is not unusual. Despite attempts to silence or isolate them, they always manage to voice theirhighly criticalviews and make headlines.
TheGreek Metropolitan of Florina, Eordaia and Prespes Augustinos Kantiotis (1907-2010, in office between 1967 and 2000) , was notorious in this respectand has left quite avivid legacy among his numerous followers through his religious 16 See Makrides 1995, pp.568-625. 
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Va siliosN .Makrides organization Stau1ó & (Cross).
17 Even before becoming ab ishop, Kantiotis had been known throughout Greece as am ilitant and uncompromising person. He had frequent conflicts withhis church colleagues,who did not sharehis militancy while trying to isolate him. "Kantiotism" has therefore been considered by many as ascourge withinGreek Orthodoxy. 18 It is noteworthy that the Patriarchate of Constantinople intervened in cases when Kantiotis followers were accused of rigorist and subversive activities in variousO rthodox dioceses,s uch as in Australia. Al ay theologian of Kantiotis movement, Nikolaos Sotiropoulos,w as formally excommunicated by the Patriarchate in 1993 on the grounds of such activities.
19 Yet, the very fact that Kantiotis remained simultaneously amemberof the church hierarchy and am ajor representative of rigorism reveals the complexity of theirintertwined connections and the dynamics that can develop in this context. Currently,t he Greek Metropolitan of Piraeus,S erapheim (Mentzelopoulos), is another member of the church hierarchy representing such arigorist stance.His controversial positions on many issues (e.g.anti-Semitic, anti-modern, anti-Ecumenical,anti-Catholic) have stirred many reactions from different sides including from other Orthodoxhierarchs. 20 Within the Russian OrthodoxChurch one can also locate severalb ishops with as imilar rigorist mentality,r eacting againsttheir more liberal or moderate fellows. 21 Consequently,the Metropolitan of St. Petersburg and Ladoga IoannSnychev (1927-1995) has been placed in this category.
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Such cases are generally isolated and do not represent those of the Orthodox mainstreama nd that of the church hierarchy as aw hole trying to mitigate in debatable issues and keep amore balanced and reasonable stance. Yet, the church positiona ss uch is not absolutely clear on this mattera nd remains rather ambivalent. On the one hand, it avoids being associated with rigorism, but on the other hand, it makes use of the rigorist potential to strengthen its own initiatives, policiesand strategies under specific circumstances. Whenevertherewas amajor conflictb etween churcha nd state,t he former usuallym obilizedt he entire Orthodox flock without making any distinctions.Inthis sense,Orthodox rigorists are equallyeager to support the official church in such critical moments,because their final aim is not its dissolution, but its amelioration. Forexample,Greek Orthodox rigorists of every provenance played acrucial role in the massive demonstrations againstt he socialistg overnmentsp lanst on ationalize the ecclesiastical and (1994) (1995) related to the exclusive religious or secular use of an old historic Romanb uilding in the city of Thessaloniki in Greece,t he Rotunda, the local diocese mobilized many rigorists,who were consideredresponsible for someriots, clashesa nd violent actions that occurred there. 25 Understandably,a ll this complicates again the separation between official church hierarchy and rigorists.I t should also be mentioned that in such broader mobilizationattempts,other and especially non-religiousactors may participate,such as those stemmingfrom the right or even extreme right political spectrum. Forexample,the recent rise of such apolitical party named "Golden Dawn" in Greece has revealed that it hasmany sympathizersfrom the broader Orthodox domain, although thereisalso an Orthodoxcriticism againstit, especially against its fascist and neo-pagan leanings.
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Theabove ambivalence becomes evident also by considering that the rigorists do not intend to leave Orthodoxyfor another religion, but they basically criticize the present condition of the church as unacceptable.I nm ost cases,t hey would have preferred to submit themselvestothe church hierarchy provided that it had fulfilledtheir needs and visions completely.Even in cases when there is aschism between rigorists and the official church, the ideal solution for both sides is reunification, although the requirements for such an undertaking are seen differently by each side.T herefore,t he harsh critique of the official church by the rigorists should not obfuscate the fact that they both have much more in common than simply differences.
This applies first to the Old Calendarists.Althoughseparated administratively from the official church, moderateO ld Calendarist circles still acknowledge its legitimacy and recognize the sacraments it performs,o nly opposing its innovations and Ecumenicalcompromises.Solely Old Calendarist hardliners follow the austere line of acomplete separation, claimingthat the official (New Calendarist) church has completely lost the sanctifying grace of sacraments and fallen victim to apostasy and heresy. 27 Mainstream Orthodoxb elievers are not prohibitedb yt he official church from going to Old Calendarist churches, af act showing the fluidity of the above separation markers.T he same is true for the monastic community of the Holy MountainA thos. Although it follows the old calendar, it shows no discrimination, aside from the Zealots,t owards the New CalendaristO rthodox believersa nd keeps good relations with the church hierarchy and the state.After all, there are no major dogmatic and otherdifferences 23 See DØpret 2010 . 24 See Makrides 2005 DØpret 2012 . 25 See Stewart 1998 . 26 See Sakellariou 2014 . 27 Brady and Melling (2001 , who distinguish here between "resistance" and "integrist" Old Calendarism.
between the Old Calendarists and the mainstream Orthodox Church, aside from the calendar issue.
Yet, occasional cooperation between the official church and rigorists does not signify the normalization of their relations.T he official church is aware of the potential danger that rigorists may bring to the unity of the church body,thus it intendst ok eep them completely underc ontrol and to mitigate theirm ilitancy, while also mobilizing them for common objectives.This policy is however not very successful, especially when rigoristc riticism of the official church escalatesinto real confrontation. Theradical and violent events in the early 1990s in the diocese of Larissa and Tyrnavos in Greece proved that the rigorist camp cannot be kept under control or used ad libitum according to the will of the church hierarchy. His intention was to bring this monastery into full communion with the rest of the Holy Community of Mount Athos.T he main reason was that the Esphigmenou monksh ad been very criticalo ft he Ecumenical endeavorso fP atriarch Athenagoras (1886 Athenagoras ( -1972 and his "dialogueoflove" with the Roman Catholic Church from the 1960s onwards.Takingcontrol of the monastery in 1971, they thus ceased commemorating the Patriarchsn ame in Liturgy and followed as trict and isolationist policy,refusing participation in the common administration of the Holy Community of Mount Athos. In the wake of the above decision,police authorities cut the electricity to the monastery and prevented the supply of food, heating oil and medical provisions,while more than 100 monks barricaded themselves in the monastery and appealedt ot he Council of State.T he conflict still remains unsolved, 30 while it attests to the strength, persistence and endurance of Orthodox rigorism. Aside from the Esphigmenou Monastery,t heree xist many other sim- ilarly-minded Zealot monks living as isolated hermits in the southern part of the Mount Athos peninsula.
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From the rigorist point of view,the mainissues of controversy with the official church can be summarized as follows;first, the dependence of the church to the state,i ts rathersuperficial role in society,and all the concomitantc ompromises jeopardizing the authentic Orthodoxt radition;s econd, the creation of ar eally free and living church organization through purification from all deficits,namely from moral and financial scandals to the modernizing and secularizing trends of many church hierarchs;third, the active participationofOrthodox lay believers in the election of their church leaders,who have to be blameless in every respect; fourth, the adulterating consequences of the contemporary global environment, including the EuropeanU nion, on the preservation of the Orthodox tradition; and finally,t he official participation of the Orthodox Church in the "heretical" Ecumenical Movement and the bilateral dialogues with other Christians,such as with Roman Catholics,who are considered to have deviated from the rightfaith. These issues are,however, raised occasionally by members of the official church, for they constitute matters of serious reflection (cf.t he reactiono ft he aforementioned Metropolitan of Piraeus Serapheim against the visit of Pope Francis to the Greek island of Lesvos in April2016 due to the refugee and migrant crisis 32 ). Likewise,anti-Ecumenicalstances at the official church level are not an exception today.T obemore specific, the Orthodox Church of Georgiain1997 33 and that of Bulgaria in 1998 34 have formally withdrawn their membership from the World Council of Churchesand the Conference of EuropeanChurches.
It is vitali nt his context to avoid confusing the rigorist positions of certain church hierarchs with the overall traditionalist stance of the church hierarchy.In fact, the church usuallylooks for a"third way" between rigoristand liberal positions and tries to mediatebetween the different camps.Onthe otherhand, its general stance is admittedly more conservative,w hich brings it closer to the rigorist camp and explains their usual correlations and constant interferences. Being part of along historicalchain of fidelity to the bequeathedChristian tradition, the Orthodox Church is particularly sensitive to this issue.Italso appears to be much more traditional than the Western ChristianChurches, both Roman Catholic and Protestant. As aresult, it often supports positions that are difficult to understand by Western criteria and modes of thinking.
Accordingt os everal scholars,the above is the case with the official Russian Orthodox Church in post-Soviet times,e xemplifying this "third way" between 31 See Brady 2001, p. 528. 32 See online article "Pura tou mitropolitiserafeim kata patriarhikai papa", available at:http://www.protothema.gr/greece/article/568020/pura-tou-mitropoliti-serafeim-katapatriarhi-kai-papa-/ [15. 04. 2016] . 33 See Crego 2014 , pp.146-147. 34 See Kalkandjieva 2014 rigorismand liberalism.
35 Its positions appear in many respects incompatible with those of the Western Churches and with the values of the Western world -consider,f or example,i ts official position of 2008 on human dignity,f reedom and rights,which has created many debates internationally.One of the main aims of this church today is the defense of so-called "traditionalvalues",anagenda which has aclear anti-Western purpose.Despite all this,the same church does not retreat to its own insulated enclave,but seekst he dialoguew ith the Western Churches and the secular world while trying to develop its international and transnational activities in an impressive way.Itwould be thus amiss to call this church rigorist simply because of its critique of modern liberal secularvalues and orientations. Quite clearly,i td oes not share the militancy,t he aggressiveness and the apocalypticfervor usually characterizing the Orthodox rigorists.Inaddition,italways tries to keep the latter under control, as it fearsa ne ventual intensification of rigorist reactions and their potential greater influence on the wider church body.
Thesame applied to the Orthodox Church of Greece under the leadership of the charismatic,yet controversial Archbishop Christodoulos (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) . He was often accused of disseminating extreme and radical views,b ut his aim was to reverse the moderate secularizationp rocess within Greeks ociety and to act againstthe privatization of religion by rendering the churchakey public factor in the country.Inthis respect, despite similarities,his attitude was not clearly rigorist, but rather conservative and neo-traditionalist. 36 Here it is about fine distinctions that draw necessary separation lines between the various phenomena under consideration in order to better capture their eventual specific characteristics and manifestations.
Furthermore,not every actor or groupexpressing anti-modern or anti-Western views can be subsumedunder the category of Orthodox rigorism. In specific cases, certainm ovements lie somehow in-between sharing selected elementsw ith rigorists,a nd distinguishing themselves from them on other issues.T he semimonastic brotherhoodsi n2 0 th centuryG reece,e specially the one named Zwh (Life), togetherw ith their affiliated sisterhoods and other dependento rganizations,b elong to this category. Basically,t hey were pietistici no utlook and focused more on internal mission and the spiritual improvement of their members.T hey also contributed to the spread of rigorism, especially through social activism, puritan ethics,p atriarchal values,n ationalistic orientations and antiWestern attitudes.Y et, these rigorist impulsesw ere mitigated by their more balanced strategy towards the official church and society, usually avoidinggetting involved in open conflicts.A saresult, despite occasionald istancing from, and tension with, the official church, there was never aschism between them.
37 Other movements,though, like the elitistintellectual one in Greece in the 1980s known 35 See Selbach 2002, pp.152-165; Papkova 2011; Stoeckl 2014 Dimanopoulou 2010. as "Neo-Orthodoxy", by no means belong to the categoryofrigorism.Aside from its intense anti-Westernism, the latter movement did not share many of the main rigoristc haracteristics and had other objectives.O ther organizations, however, such as the previously mentioned Panellh nio& O1qó doxo& Enwsi& (Panhellenic Orthodox Union), clearly belong to the rigorist camp,asthey formulate ahighly criticala nd aggressive discourse and seek to mobilize theira dherents against anything that they perceive as danger for Orthodoxy and Greece.
What is then quite typical of Orthodox rigorist groups and actors? We should keep in mind that the rigorist camp is basically construed along cultural commonalities rather than class cleavages.
38 Such rigorists usually exhibit as trong Manichaeanmentality and are guided by apocalyptic and eschatological scenarios,based on the BookofRevelation and other prophetic texts and legends,about ageneral battle between good and evil and the imminent end of the world. Among them the enemy syndrome is particularly strong and pervasive.T hey constantly locate lurking enemies everywhere who have designs againstO rthodoxy.T his condition is further strengthened by conspiracyt heories of all sorts (especially involving Jews and Freemasons) aimed at destroying the pristine Orthodox faith. Yet, we should not assume that rigorists are generally uneducated and ignorant persons,asacommonand widespread stereotypeabout such and relatedpeople usually postulates.T op ut it correctly,i ti sa bout the overall rigorist discourse which lacks sophistication, complexity and erudition, as it tends to give simplistic, one-dimensional and categoricala nswers to the questions it deals with on the basis of adichotomic logic.Additionally,rigorists place particular emphasis on the supposedly intact preservationofOrthodoxy,the sole true faithrevealed by God in the entire world, and are ready to go to extremes in guarding and protecting it. They also defend puritanical ethics and patriarchal family values.Asaresult, they are usually militant in outlook and may also resort to violentactions in pursuing their goals,g iven that violence receivess trong divine legitimacy by their overarchingc onceptual scheme. Another feature relatest ot he phenomenono f "Hyper-Orthodoxy", namely when rigorists accuse each other of betrayal and deviation from the right Orthodox path. This,inturn, leads to numerous internal schisms within the rigorist camp and to the creation of opposite splinter-groups competingand claimingthe sole authentic possessionofthe right faith. 39 In some extreme cases,r igorists may decide to sacrifice their livesf or their beliefs in an apocalypticb attle against the "powers of darkness" and look for salvation in escaping this world. Thes ense of their electedness as representingt he faithful remnant in as inful world is particularly strong and pervasive among them and leads to greater tension with their surrounding environment,r eligious and otherwise. In general, the linesseparatingthe rigorists from the outside fallenworld (which may also include the official church) are drawn in strict and clear terms.
38 See Riesebrodt2000, pp.277-279. 39 See Makrides 1991, pp.62-65. Such attitudescan be clearly observed in the early history of the Old Believers movement in the Russian Empire, who separated themselves from the official church in 1666/7 afterthe church and ritual reforms initiated by Patriarch Nikon. These were interpreted as cardinaldeviations from the already definitely established Orthodoxfaith and tradition,and as clear signs of the imminent coming of the Antichrist and the final battle between good and evil. As aresult, they were violently persecuted afterwards by state forces with church support and retreated to isolated places in their own enclaves.Inseveral cases at the end of the 17 th and early 18 th century,they preferred self-immolation in an utterly apocalyptic climate rather than surrendering to the state forces and the "heretical Russian Church", representing the fall from the right faith. In fact, these are believed to be the biggestm ass suicidec ases knowni nh istory. 40 All this forcedO ld Believers to massive emigration abroad, and their communities are nowadays found in different parts of the world, from CentralAsia to Canada and South America. From the 19 th century onwards they progressively gained more legitimacy in society,yet the typical features of Orthodox rigorism accompanied them constantly.Further, there were numerous internal schisms within the Old Believers movement out of variousreasons leading to the formation of many competinggroups. Tw owide sets of groups are those of the popovtsy (priestly) and the bezpopovtsy (priestless), having to do with the problemofl egitimate priestlysuccession and the issue of authority in their ranks. 41 Characteristically,t he above mentioned features of a rigoristm entality can be observed among various contemporary Old Believers communities across the globe,a sas ocial anthropological study of such ac ommunity in Canada has vividly shown.
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Similar attitudes can be observed in the aforementioned protest movement of the Old Calendarists,t he self-named "True OrthodoxC hristians", and their affiliated organizations.T hese came into being in the wake of the adoptionofthe new (corrected Gregorian) calendar by the Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1923 and by the Greek OrthodoxC hurch in 1924. Afteri nitial (organized) oppositiontothe reform, aschismfollowedwhen three metropolitans left the OrthodoxChurch of Greece in 1935 and foundedaseparate synod. In particular,Old Calendaristscondemned the Ecumenicalopeningsofthe Orthodox Church, especially of the Patriarchate of Constantinople,t owards Western Churches and have always kept ahighly anti-Ecumenicalstance.But soon afterwards therewere severalinternal splits withinthe Old Calendaristmovementitself.This led to the creationofvarious jurisdictions of Old Calendarists in different countries,whose numberisestimated in hundreds of thousands,while their sympathizersare much more numerous.T oday,Old Calendaristsare foundnot only in Greece,Cyprus, Romania and Bulgaria, but also have communities and deploy activities else-40 See Robbins 1986 . 41 See Feldmann 1995 . 42 See Scheffel 1991 where (Western Europe,USA). There have been attempts to establish abroader intercommunion between them,a si n1 977 between the Greek Old Calendarist "Cyprianite" group and the Romanian Old Calendarists. 43 Like in the previous case of the Old Believers,living in aWestern setting does not necessarilyrender a group or an actor more tolerant and liberal, but, on the contrary,m ay lead to further isolationa nd radicalization. Needless to say,O ld Calendarists deny any relationship with fundamentalism while accusing their opponents and critics of endorsing such an attitude. 44 Another area in which rigorist mentalities and attitudes especially flourish, as the previously mentioned Esphigmenou case has shown, is the Orthodox monastic world, althoughr igorism is certainly not representative of the entire spectrum of Orthodoxmonasticism.
45 Acase in point, here,are the conversations the Scottish writer William Dalrymple held with amonk named Theophanes at the Greek Orthodox Mar Saba monastery in the West Bank. 46 Despite the literary reworking of these conversations and their hilarious nature,one may hear what Father Theophanes appears to say there from many other Orthodoxmonks.AntiWestern, anti-Catholic and anti-Ecumenical mentalities,a pocalyptic scenarios, Manichaeanworldviews and conspiracy theories involving Jews,Freemasons and Western Christiansr emain exactly the same.H istorically speaking, monastics alwaysp resented problems to the church hierarchy and the state (e.g.i nB yzantiumd uring the Iconoclastic controversy) due to their adamant, rigid and uncompromising views. Also,the fact that in manycases monastics enjoy ahigher esteem among Orthodox believers due to their way of life than the members of the church hierarchyc ontributes to this tension.I nr eality,m onastics are ready to differentiate themselves from the church hierarchy and the mainstream whenever they suspect compromises jeopardizing the Orthodoxf aith. It is thus not accidentalt hat the above mentioned Old Calendaristm ovementi nitially found a fertile groundtospreadamong monastics (e.g.the Zealots on the HolyMountain Athos), af act that remains valid until today.I nterestingly, recent attempts to renovate and modernize the Athosm onastic community through subventions from the European Unionhave altered its historicaland traditional profile to a large extent.T herefore,i tc ame as no surprise that this process triggered again numerous rigorist reactions of all sorts.
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Similar attitudes and trends can be observed in many Orthodox monastic milieus in post-communist times(e. g. in Russia, Romania, Georgia). This has alot to do with the challenges that these churches as aw hole have faced in the postcommunist period, which, among otherthings,required anovel arrangement with the Western world and Churches.S uch at ransitionw as quited ifficult;afact explaining the numerous related tensions,debates and conflicts.Itisinthis context that Orthodox rigorists often became quite radical,a ggressive and violent attempting to implement their ideas in society and voicing their protest against the dangers posed to the Orthodoxt radition. This change can be explainedb yr eference to the model of "de-secularization".
48 Many post-communist countries have becomethe scenes of such violent incidents involvingOrthodox actors who felt threatened by variousnovel developments,especially globalization, secularism, liberalism, pluralismand multiculturalism. 49 Forexample,inEkaterinburg in 1998 several theological books written by well-known Russian Orthodox theologians( A. Men,A .S chmemann, J. Meyendorff) werep ubliclyb urned at the courtyard of at heological seminaryb ecause they were considered to contain liberala nd heretical doctrines in clear disagreement with the Orthodox faith. Interestingly enough, the local bishopN ikon (Mironov) seemedt oh ave been involved in the whole incident, 50 whichs hows again the shiftingb oundaries between official church and rigorism. Ayear later, however, due to variouso ther accusations the bishop was removedf rom his office by the HolyS ynod of the Russian Orthodox Church.
In another case in Moscow,amodern art exhibition, entitled "Beware, Religion!" (Ostorozhno, religiia!), was organized at the Zakharov-Museuma nd Cultural Center in January2 003. This exhibitionw as,h owever, considered by severalO rthodox hardliners as blasphemous,i nsulting and highly provocative, this is why they stormed the building and interruptedt he exhibitionc ausing serious damage to the exhibits.Remarkably,theserigoristswere finally acquitted by the court, which in turn condemned the organizers of the exhibition to a financial penalty for insulting the religious feelingsofthe Orthodoxpopulation.
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Last, but not least, one has to mention the numerous cases of discrimination and harassmentofn on-Orthodox religiousc ommunities in Russia,mostly at alocal level and often including violent actions,byOrthodox rigorists of varied provenance,w hich have been repeatedly publicized by the international fora on religious freedom.
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Such escalations of Orthodox-motivated violencedonot however take place solely in post-communists contexts, but have also taken place earlier in the Orthodox world, mostly in arigorist frame.After all, there is along historical tradition of aspecific Orthodoxz ealotry and rigorism, which, among other things, involved coercion, use of force and violence (e. Thetargets of rigorist reactions have also experienced transformation over the course of time.F or instance,t heir traditionala nti-Westernism was often transformed into an anti-Europeanism, especially after 1981 when Greece,asthe first predominantly Orthodox country,o fficially joined the European Economic Community.Further developments withinthis frame always gave rise to Orthodox responses,asrigorists feared the loss of national sovereignty within the later European Uniona nd the adulteration of the authentic Orthodoxt radition. All these events were usually interpretedi napocalyptic terms as indicating the imminentc omingo ft he end of the world. This also explainst he 1998 massive reactionsi nA thensa gainst the ratificationo ft he Schengen Convention by the Greek Parliament (8 December 1997).
55 Rigorist reactions may also turn against the perceivednegativeeffects of the ongoing globalization process and the dangers it puts to local cultures. Thus,t he cases of Orthodox rigorists involved in variousanti-globalization protests against the "new world order" after the end of communism should also be mentioned.
Finally, another terrain, in which such rigoristmentalitiesand attitudes can be located, concerns the various converts to Orthodox Christianity across the globe. In fact, this is ag rowing phenomenon in severalc ontexts,W estern and nonWestern alike,w ith numerous and diverse manifestations.T ob et rue,t he conversion processi sam ultifarious and complexo ne and may have quite diverse consequences for the convertedp erson. In our case,s ome converts are deeply affected by the fact that Orthodoxy claimst ob et he sole authentic form of Christianity going back to the Christianorigins and the sole true religious faith in the world. To al arge extent, this has to do with the consequences of the literal understanding of the term "Orthodoxy", which will be explainedm ore extensively in the next section.Such intense,absolute and exclusiveclaims convey a strong senseo fc ertainty and concomitantc onfidence with far-reaching repercussions.I nt his way,t he phenomenon of converts,a ppearing sometimes as "born-again" Christians and expressing rigorist views,e ven against mainstream Orthodox believers,isnot an exception. Theusual features of rigorism mentioned above appear in many such cases in extreme and even idiosyncratic forms.Good examples thereof are the controversial street evangelist and cleric in the USA 54 See Makrides 1991 , p. 59-60. 55 See Makrides 2004 Nathanael Kapner, who is aconverttoOrthodoxy from Judaism, 56 and the writer, film director and public speaker Frank Schaeffer 57 .All this is indicative of the rich varietyo ft he forms and ways in whichO rthodox rigorismm akes itself active, knownand publiclyvisible.
Background, developmentand transformationofOrthodox rigorism
In view of the specificities of Orthodoxr igorism, it appearsn ecessary to make them clearer and more understandable by examining the background, the development and the later transformations of the entire phenomenon. Although my main focus here lies more on its modern aspects,the long socio-historical backgroundo fO rthodox rigorisms hould also be takeni nto account. No doubt, as alreadym entioned, cases of rigor, zealotry and extremism can be observed throughout the history of Orthodox Christianity, being motivated, among other things,b yt he unshaken belief in the singular and exclusive correctness and absoluteness of the Orthodox faith. Although thereisaline of continuity,modern Orthodox rigorism should be mainlyassociated with the radical changes that took place from the early modern period onwards and have posedserious challenges to European Christianity as aw hole.I nd iscussing the modern background of Orthodoxrigorism in asuccinct way,itishelpfultodistinguish between the endogenous and the exogenous causes of the phenomenon. Theendogenous ones refer more to cardinaland interrelated factors germane to the overall articulation and development of Orthodox Christianitya cross time and its own historical formation. Theexogenousones relate more to specific influences and challenges to the Orthodox world coming from outside (mostlya nd usually from Western Europe in modern times), which triggered variousr esponses and reactions includingrigorist ones in specific Orthodoxcontexts. Starting with the endogenous causes,w es hould first mention the catalytic significance that the historical East-West opposition had in Europe from Byzantinet imes and especially in the wake of the separation of the two churches. There already existsq uite ah uge array of literature aboutthe far-reaching and multidimensionalconsequencesofthe "Great Schism" (1054) 58 This is because in the eyes of these Orthodox, the Pope personified the entire RomanCatholic Church, which hasbeen inimically viewedfor many centuriesasfallen, heretical and the "abode of the Antichrist",a nd is still considered as am ajor threat to the Orthodox world. This is typicalofthe enemy syndrome and defensive attitudes characterizing generations of Orthodox Christians including the rigorists,b oth historicallya nd at present. Interestingly enough, the East-West opposition did not remain solelyareligious one,but included many other non-religious aspects.W estern Europeand -more broadly speaking -the West came to signify for numerous Orthodox the places out of which dangersfor the Orthodox East had solely originated. It is about the "secularization"ofthe original Orthodox anti-Westernismand its incorporation into aw ider anti-Western scheme.C haracteristically, this anti-Western frame is not supported solely by Orthodox actors,but is endorsed under specific circumstancesbysecular ones for variousreasons (e.g.political, social, cultural). Nevertheless,the Orthodox dimension of anti-Westernism remains the cardinaland prominent one in the rigoristworldview and discourse,asthey prefer to evaluate past and currente vents accordingt ot heir own specific criteria( e. g. eschatological, apocalyptic,Manichaean). On the contrary,the official church hierarchy generally is morediplomatic and careful in its relation to the Western Churches.In sum, the strong anti-Western sentiments of the rigorists should be placed on this broader historical Orthodox canvas of anti-Westernism in order to be adequately understood.
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Another vital factor in this category has to do with the particular understanding of the term "Orthodoxy" in our milieu across history, 60 which should be also examined against the background of the consequences that the establishment of monotheistic religionsbrought about historically. 61 No doubt, this term is applied to aplurality of differentcases today,both in religious and non-religiouscontexts. Thep otential relations between fundamentalism in general and the notion of Orthodoxyhave also been discussed. Jaroslav Pelikan has triedtodissociate the teachings of modern American Protestant fundamentalismfrom those of Christian Orthodoxy;n amely from the mainstream of the historicald evelopment of Christian doctrine,both in its pluralism and its underlying consensus. 62 Yet, in our case we are referring to ap articular literal understanding of the term "Orthodoxy", which has been deeply ingrained as such in OrthodoxC hristian consciousness over the centuries.T he Orthodox are subsequently seena st he only ones in possession of the sole right and exclusive religious faith in the entire world, based on Godsr evelation, from which Western Christians have deviated.T he right Christian faith and its exact, unaltered preservation werethus regarded as extremely important in life and were also inextricably connectedwith the salvation of the soul and eternal life after death. Already in Byzantine timesa nd especially in the wake of the East-West church conflicts,the issue of preserving the right Christian faith became am ost central one.I nm any cases,p ossessing Orthodoxy was regarded as the highestachievementone could ask for in life.Out of this strong and pervasive conviction, various socio-cultural consequencesa rose historically in the Orthodoxw orld. Fore xample,i nt he modern period several Orthodox Christians tried to compensate for the deficits of their societies by emphasizing the insuperable value of Orthodoxy that they always possessed.In their view,this was the sole true criterionofsuperiority and electedness,clearly distinguishing the authentic OrthodoxEast from the fallen Western Europe.The latter was successful solely in numerous trivial mundane areas,yet it lacked Orthodoxy,w hich in fact rendered it inferior. Such and similara rguments were formulated and disseminated by the Orthodoxinmany cases,especially when a comparison between the achievements of East and West was at hand. 63 All this has to do with the multiple socio-cultural consequences of the literal understandingof the term "Orthodoxy" in the past and at present, which is ratheru nique in our case.Such consequences can also be observed among Orthodox rigorists,even in extreme forms. Manya forementioned speciala nd other features of Orthodox rigorism have alot to do with this particular literal understandingofOrthodoxy, which in the end resorts to the ideology of "Orthodoxism". This includes, among other things,asense of superiority,triumphalism,self-complacency and self-sufficiency,M anichaean mentality,e nemy syndrome,c onspiracy theories,a nd last but not least, the use of violence.The latter is usually justified by reference to the right, legitimate and higher aims of Orthodoxr igorism.I ns um, the above phenomenon can be observed with varying intensity duringdifferent periods of Orthodoxhistory,while the rigorists are part of this long chain of understanding and internalizing Orthodoxyinsuch aparticular way.
Ar elated important factor, on which the rigorists also place particular emphasis,relatestothe positionoftradition within OrthodoxChristianity as awhole. By comparing it with the RomanC atholic or the Protestant cases,i tb ecomes obvious that OrthodoxC hristianity is much more traditional. After all, it also claimstobethe only church to have kept the authentic Christiantradition without major or minori nnovations across time.A ll this creates quite at raditionalistic environmentthat neglects and denies reforms altogether while always idealizing the "idyllic past" and its normative character in evaluating the present and the future situation. 64 Remarkably, this kind of Orthodoxt raditionalism has often overcome its religious borders historically and has become more influential in society, politics and culture -a gain a" secularization" of this initially religious 63 See Makrides 2006 . 64 See Ramet 2006 phenomenon. Forthe rigorists once more,tobeconnected with this long historical chain of upholding the Orthodox tradition intact is regarded as a sine qua non and becomes the sourceoftheir strong motivation and sense of electedness.Especially under the conditionso fm odernity and postmodernity,a sw ell as the ongoing globalization process,rigoristsfear the loss or the adulteration of the Orthodox tradition, afact explaining their extensive mobilization and continuous reactions. It has been mentioned before that fundamentalism for many reasons should not be equated to amere traditionalism, although this has been also attempted for the Orthodox case. 65 Yet, from the above analysis it becomes obvious that here we are dealingwith one of the particularities of Orthodoxrigorism due to its specific and omnipresentrelationship to tradition.
Taking into consideration the exogenous causes that have led to the rise of Orthodox rigorism, we should look for its specific socio-historical background, as well as for its later transformations and contemporary socio-cultural contexts. These causes should be primarily soughtfrom the early moderntimes onwards,as the Orthodoxworld in its different contexts (e.g.the Russian Empire,the Balkans under Ottoman rule) has increasingly come into contact with Western modernity and was influenced accordingly in many domains.I tw as ap rocess that created quite serious engagements,tensions,debates and conflicts in the Orthodoxworld and led in many cases to deep cleavagesinthe respective societies between proWestern and anti-Western trends,movements and actors.Aswas to be expected, the Orthodox side was overwhelmingly aligned with the anti-Western camp and at times played the leading role in the respective reactions.Itwas exactly this wide exposure to Western influences over the last centuries that led, among other things,tothe rise of modern Orthodox rigorism.
Such developments can be clearly observed in the Russian Empireespecially after the Westernizing and modernizing efforts of Tsar Peter I, which were continued throughoutthe 18 th century under the decisiveinfluence of West European Enlightenment. Thelatter, in fact, set the main premises for the Western program of modernity and its wider application.
66 Therelatedsocio-cultural changes were often perceived as dramatic crises and led to variousrigorist reactions in Russia, including those of the previously mentioned Old Believers,w ho saw the clear evidence of the distancing from the pureOrthodox tradition in the Westernization process.G iven that the official church was in many ways tightly bound to the Tsarist regime and did not present any serious challengetothe attempted societal changes under Western influence,rigorist reactions here originated mostly from the monastic milieus or independent Orthodoxb elievers and thinkers.T he related problems became more evident especially during the 19 th centurywhen the key problem of Russiasidentity and future coursewas strongly debated among a large variety of competing ideological currents and movements,representing at 65 See Yannaras 1992 times diametrically opposed views and attitudes.Many of them stood in different forms under the formativei nfluence of the Orthodox tradition (e.g.t he Slavophiles), yet they did not represent stricto sensu rigorist reactions.A sa lready mentioned, not all Orthodox protest formations and actions fall under the category of rigorism. Some rigorist views can be located in the movement of the socalled Pochvenniki,n amely those close to the "soil" of the Russian land and people, who were mostly groupedt ogethera round aj ournaln amed Vremia (Epoch). At the beginning, they intended to reconcile the Westernizersand the Slavophiles and received various influences besides the Orthodoxones.Y et, this initial spirit soon faded, and they started strongly supporting the indigenous elements of Russian culture (e.g.a utocracy,a nti-Westernism, nationalism) and "natives oil conservatism" 67 .T he exactb oundariesb etween the above groups were,however, never strict and clear.The well-knownwriter Fyodor M. Dostoevsky thus had closer elationsb oth to the Slavophiles and the Pochvenniki. Characteristically,t here is al ine of continuity between the Pochvenniki movement and contemporary Orthodox rigorists in post-Soviet Russia.
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Analogous developments can also be observedinthe Orthodox Balkans under Ottoman rule from the second half of the 18 th century onwards, again under the decisive influence of West EuropeanEnlightenment. In thiscontext,rigorist reactionshad more to do with the marginalization of the greatersocietalrole of the Patriarchate of Constantinople and -more broadly speaking -ofanOrthodoxbased worldview in society and culture in the wakeofW estern secularizing ideas and practices.These reactions exhibitedvarious sectarian and utopian elementsof an all-encompassing transcendental order,acentral component of proto-fundamentalist movements.
69 Theso-called Kollyvades controversy over the issues of memorial services and frequentcommunion, which erupted in the 1750s on the Holy Mountain Athos and later spread in othera reas,d emonstrated such characteristics.Infact, it also had to do with the growing Western influences at that time and their potential threat to the inheritedOrthodox tradition. Many of the protagonists of the Kollyvades movement clearly expressed such arigorist mentality,which forced the official church to take measures againstand to condemn them. Thespirit of early Orthodox rigorism lingered on in the 19 th century after the foundation of the Greek state in 1830 and was again expressed by various actors,m ovements and organizations in different forms,m ostly in strong antiWestern settings,ranging from acritique of official church decisions to reactions against academic theology.N umerous Orthodoxb elievers thought that the church was allowing dangerous compromises to take place and that counteraction to stopthe demise of Orthodoxy was imperative. 70 Thes ubjection of the 67 See Dowler 1983 . 68 See Aksiuchits 1990 Selbach 2002 church to the state during the regime of the Bavarian KingOtto (1833-1862), the unilateral declaration of its autocephaly and independence from the Patriarchate of Constantinople in 1833, andthe closing of numerous monasteries throughout the country were amongthe radical changes that triggered rigorist reactions and popularp rotest movements,s uch as the one led by ChristophorosP anagiotopoulos,a lias Papoulakos (1770-1861). Thes ocio-religious criticismo ft he monk Kosmas Flamiatos (1786-1852) and that of the lay popularp reacher Apostolos Makrakis( 1831 Makrakis( -1905 are also cases in point. Aside from this,O rthodoxrigorists still found ways to cooperate with the church in the secondhalf of the 19 th century,especially in the context of the virulent Greek nationalism and irredentism.
In the course of the 20 th centurymany predominantly Orthodox countries were found under al ong communist rule ,a nd this of course heavily affected the respective positions of the Orthodox Churches,which weresubjected to the inimical attitude of,and often to persecution by,the communist regimes.This was aserious curtailmentofOrthodox rigorist reactions in thesecountries.Y et, such attitudes were clearly observed among various church formationsthat had originated in this context and laterbecame activeoutside the realmofcommunism. Themost characteristic case is that of the Russian Orthodox Church Outside Russia (ROCOR), which separated itself fromthe Moscow Patriarchate in 1927 and developed further in the West, endorsinginmany cases rigorist positions (e.g.anti-Ecumenical). It also cooperated and enteredinto church communion in 1994 through af ormal act with various groups of Old Calendarists in Greece, Bulgaria and Romania. This lasted until 2006 when the ROCOR startedd iscussions about its reunion with the Russian Orthodox Church, which formally took place in 2007. In addition, back in 1955, somebishops from the ROCORhad enabled the canonicalc ontinuity of successionw ithin the Old Calendarist movementb yc onsecratinga na rchbishop and other bishops. 71 Thel atter, as already mentioned, was the outcome of the increased openingsofthe Patriarchate of Constantinople towardsmodern demands (e.g.onthe calendar issue), but also towards otherC hristian Churches( e. g. with the encyclical of 1920 "Tot he Churches of Christ wheresoever they may be"). 72 Forthe rigorists,this attested not only to the "heresy of Ecumenism", but also to the internal decaying of Orthodox Church leaderss upportings uch dangerous innovations. 73 All this had in turn serious implications for local Orthodox Churches,such as the Greek one,causing again rigorist opposition that culminated in the Old Calendarist schism. 73 See Ware,2002 , p. 7. 74 See Kitsikis 1995 entailedaseries of economic, political and cultural transformations including the feared erosion of local religious and nationalidentities.Infact, the connectionof the globalization process with the intensification of fundamentalist and other related movements and reactions worldwidehas been emphasized by many theorists. 75 Thep ost-World WarI Ip eriod saw namely the emergence of common transnational patterns in all domains,from globalpolity and economytoreligion, which were connectedwith aweakening of Western hegemonyand concomitant new challenges for local cultures.
76 Globalization went hand in hand with an unprecedentedinfluxofnew lifestyles,ideas and morals,which was perceived as a serious problembythe rigorists.The present global syncretistic environmentwith its idealsofpluralism, secularism, multiculturalism, tolerance,and liberalism put the rigorist view on the uniqueness of the Orthodox truth to the test and threatened their exclusivity and superiority claimsabout an Orthodox hegemonic culture.Itisnot an accident, for example,that rigorists have been very critical to the adhesion of Greecet ot he EuropeanE conomic Community in 1981. 77 In connectionw ith this,t he current postmoderne ra of change,r elativism, ambiguity, contingency and uncertainty has also prompted fundamentalist particularistic reactions of all kinds, 78 and the sameholds true for the Orthodoxrigorists as well. Anew era of an Orthodoxrigorist resurgencetook place afterthe collapse of the communist regimes and the concomitantl iberalization of religion in the respectivec ountries.T he Orthodox Churches and cultures of the former Eastern Bloc were suddenly foundi naperiod of transition and restructuring, which included alot of unexpected serious challenges withinthe currentglobal environment. One such challenge related to coming to terms withreligious and cultural pluralism. It is thusnot accidentalthat Orthodoxrigorism was often intensified in such contextsand received wider support from numerous believers,especiallyas the boundaries between the religious and the secular shifted causing major culture wars. 79 In post-SovietR ussia severalO rthodox actors today exhibit key rigorist characteristics,a re critical of the pro-Western orientations of non-Orthodoxo r seculara ctors,o ppose inter-Christian dialogue and Ecumenical initiatives,a nd criticize the official church of endorsing compromising positions. 80 In addition, we can witness here the rise of various Orthodox apocalyptic and eschatological scenarios about the imminent end of the world, the coming of the Antichrist, the Jewish and Masonicp lan for worldwided omination and numerous other conspiracy theories (e.g.a bout the ritual murder of the last Tsarist family by the Bolsheviks). It should not be forgotten that the well-knowna nti-Semitic conspiracy text The Protocols of the Elders of Zion was forged and first published in the Russian Empire at the beginning of the 20 th century, whereas it also enjoys great popularity in post-Soviet times.
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All this often brings Orthodoxrigorists closertovarious other groups in contemporary Russia, including monarchists,n ationalists,f ascists,E urasianists,o r neo-communists.D espite their differences in ideology,o rientations and objectives, they all aim in one way or anothertodefend the Orthodox and national character of the countryf rom an inimical, Western-led takeover. 82 Further, rigorist attitudes flourish in various Orthodox organizationsand brotherhoods of lay believers,headed by alay elder or aclergyman, which are not under the direct control of the church (e.g.the Obshchestvo "Radonezh").
83 Theboundaries between these brotherhoods remain generally fluid. Although there are certain more liberal ones,i nm ost cases theye xhibit the usual features of Orthodox rigorist mentality (e.g.anti-Western, anti-Ecumenical, xenophobic).
84 Theofficial church has repeatedly triedt oc ontrol and coordinate the activities of these brotherhoods througha"Uniono fO rthodox Brotherhoods", founded in 1990. Yet, it is clear that this was not the case in the long run, simply because of the extreme rigorist views and tendencies flourishing within such milieus,which are incompatible with the rathermoderate attitude of the official church.
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Even if not in control of the church hierarchy,r igorists in post-communist Russia constantly put pressureo ni t, while their positions are often reflected in official churchs tatements and policies.
86 Thus,t hey often forcet he church to criticize or take measures against liberal and reformist Orthodoxp riests (e.g. Father Georgii Kotchetkov), who are considered dangerousf or upholding the authentic Orthodoxtradition.
87 Once more, an absolute distinction between the church hierarchy and the rigorists becomes difficult, as they often share more than they openlyconfess;for example,aconservativediscourse presenting Orthodox Russia as an effective antidote against the constant decline of the fallenmodern world due to Western influences. 88 There have also been attemptsa tapoliti- 81 See Hagemeister 2006 . This text enjoys popularity in other Orthodoxcultures as well, not only among rigorists,b ut also amongm embers of the church hierarchy.C oncerning Greece, see Psarras 2013 . 82 See Shenfield 2001 Shnirelman 2015 . 83 See Verkhovskii 1998 -99, pp.98-109. 84 See Rock2002 and 2003 see also Rousselet1993. 85 See Rock2003, pp.339-342; see also Mitrofanova2014. 86 See Selbach 2002 58(November 1994), pp.47-48; 85(August 2001), pp.50-51; see furtherSelbach 2002, pp.143-146; Agadjanian2014, pp.191-207; Brüning 2016 . 88 See Verkhovsky 2006 cizationofOrthodoxy,inwhich rigoristcircles are sometimesactively involved.
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Amongother cases,this form of "political Orthodoxy" has alreadybeen observed in the Ukraine during the 2000s and more recentlyduring the Russian-Ukrainian conflicti nt he separatist regiono fE astern Ukraine (Luhansk and Donetsk), receiving support from variouschurch circles including official ones. 90 Despite all this,weshould not overlook the fact that post-Soviet Russian Orthodoxy exhibits further characteristics that do not belong to the above categories.
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Taking alook at some other cases,the consecutive wars during the 1990s and the subsequent final dissolutionofYugoslaviahave also caused various reactions on the part of Orthodox Serbian rigorists.These have astrong anti-Western tradition of their own, which has re-emerged aftercommunism in novel forms; 92 for example,throughthe ultra-Orthodox brotherhood Obraz (Honor), through the canonization of conservative and anti-Western clerics, such as Nikolai Velimirović (1881 -1956 ) and Justin Popović (1894 -1979 , or through the critique of liberalminded clerics,s uch as Radovan Bigović (1956 Bigović ( -2012 . In general, traditionalist and conservative attitudesp redominate in the post-communist period, which is understandable in the light of the radical socio-political and cultural changes effected there.O rthodox rigorists have also interpretedt he deep and tenacious financial crisis of Greeces ince 2009 in similar,c onspiracy-drivenn egative colours. 93 The" new world order", broughta bout by severalg round-breaking changes (political,military,economic, cultural etc.) , is usually interpreted by the rigorists according to their own conspiracy logic.
As already mentioned, Orthodox rigorists are not found today solely in the historical Orthodox heartlands,b ut are also spread in the Orthodox diaspora across the globe and in quite different settings.T he phenomenon of growing Orthodox transnationalism 94 has also contributed to this internationalization of rigorism with diverse consequences. One may thus find Old Calendarists operating in the USA (e.g.the Center for Traditionalist Orthodox Studies,Etna, CA), and elsewherei nt he West, opposingn ot only Ecumenisma nd the calendarr eform, but the overall threat of modernism to the church. They sometimesattempt to create ab roaderp an-Orthodox rigoristf ront against the respective church hierarchiesa nd try to keep the outer boundarieso fO rthodox identification as strict as possible;for example, by outright negatingthe canonicity and legitimacy 89 See Mitrofanova2004. 90 See Hovorun 2016 , pp.58-60. 91 See Agadjanian 2014 and 2015 . 92 See Buchenau2006, 2011a and 2011b Seeo nlinea rticle "SeniorG reek Priest Blames Jews forG reecesF inancial Problems", availableat:http://www.haaretz.com/jewish-world/senior-greek-priest-blamesjews-for-greece-s-financial-problems-1. 332131[24.01. 2016] . 94 See Roudometof 2015. of the sacraments (e.g.b aptism)p erformed by non-OrthodoxC hristians. 95 In other cases,tensions arise when Orthodox monastic elders (gé1onte& or startsy) try to disseminate their rigorist views and practicestoOrthodox communities in Western settings;aprocess that may lead to internal tensions and divisions between traditionalista nd more progressive members within such communities.
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All this happens because of the widespread belief among rigorists and other Orthodox believers that these monastics,due to their ascetic life and contact with God, possess aparticular understanding of the Orthodox truth (a kind of hidden, esoteric knowledge),aswell as specialabilities (e.g.inforeseeing future events). It goes withoutsaying that such persons are then turned into the main "guardians of Orthodoxy", and their popularity and authority are extremely enhanced, sometimes at the expense of official church positions.But the samemay happen in the historical Orthodox heartlands as well, especially when not only monastic elders,b ut also young,i nexperienced and immature clerics (mladostarchestvo) acquiresuch aspiritual authority in an Orthodox community,thus again causing variousproblems and tensions. 97 Finally,itisinteresting to mention that Orthodox rigorism relates to the notion of the decoupling of religion and culture,elaborated by Olivier Roy.
98 This is not understood here in the sense of ade-territorialization of religion in the wake of its separation from alocal culture due to the process of globalization.Neitherhas it to do with the quest for a "pure religion" independent of cultural variations and local influences.I ti sm ore related to the fact that rigorists oppose at ransformation of religion into ac ulture,b asically understood as ap rofane entity, which is adominant trendinthe context of secularizationand the emphasis put on worldly concerns.Thereby religion loses its primary character and is transformed into ab roader and non-binding elementt hat belongst oarather all-inclusive cultural frame of reference.Inthis sense,culture is regarded as athreat, given that ideally -accordingtothe rigorist worldview -everything has to be or to become "religious".Itisthus abasic conviction of the rigorists that the OrthodoxChurch has gradually moved in this direction, lost its critical, prophetic voice in society, and surrendered itself to the growing pressure of the surrounding secular culture. As ar esult, it was forcedt om ake variousm inor and major compromises that jeopardize the highly cherished right faith, namely Orthodoxy.Inthe end, to be an Orthodox today means belongingtoaspecific culture,which naturally includes much morethan religion and in whichthe Orthodox factor plays moreorless an insignificant, decorative role.B yc ontrast, according to the rigorists,t he church should be liberated from this adulterating "culturalc aptivity" and get rid of its mere characterization as acoincidental feature of aspecific cultural identity.Asa 95 See Morris 1998 . Foracharacteristic case,see Cavarnos 1992 . 96 See Cimino 2011 see also Vladimir 2005 . 98 See Roy 2010 consequence,p atterns of modern religiosity,s uch as when Orthodoxy is understood as af orm of "diffused religion", as an abstract, non-normative category devoid of any concrete practical consequences,and as acultural asset and integral part of amodernbroadercultural identity, 99 are repudiated by the rigorists.Onthe contrary,they support afirm, conscious and genuine attachment to the Orthodox tradition and areal and precise familiarity with its teachings, practice and spirituality.T herefore,i ti sn os urprise that they criticize the majority of the mainstream believers as exhibitingsigns of Orthodox anemia, because the latter go to church only on selected occasions( e. g. great feasts or rites of passage) and are religious only superficiallyand nominally.Needlesstosay,all this turns againstthe secularization process,which entails significant transformations of religious belief and belonging in the postmoderncontext.
Are there any Orthodoxresources against rigorism?
Theabove elaborations on the various facets of Orthodoxrigorism in the past and at present do not signify that this is the most prominent feature of Orthodox Christianity. Thelatterconstitutes amuch more pluriformand diversified system with ag reat variety of aspects and expressions.T he mainstream Orthodoxb elievers,b eing attached rathert oacultural form of Orthodoxy, do not support rigorismand do not share its views on church and society.Inother words,itisnot amiss to arguet hat rigorism is am arginalp henomenon within the Orthodox world, also from aquantitative perspective.
Yet, there are two things to be takeninto account at this point:first, due to the rigorists relations with the official church hierarchy and theirmobilization power, rigorista ttitudes and actions becomea tt imesq uite visible in society,t hus they may attract not only the occasional curiosity of outside observers,but also greater attention from various socials trata. Second, rigorism receives support, both directly and indirectly,f rom the fact that the Orthodox Christianm ilieu still remains,toalarge extent, quite traditionalist with many respective characteristics,a fact that differentiates it substantially from the respective Protestant and Roman Catholic cases in Western Europe.I ti ss till am ilieu that cherishes the unquestioned authorities of the past and lacks self-critical attitudes and ac onstructive view of the future.Therefore,itisnot accidental that modern theological methods and hermeneutics have so far foundl ittle fertile ground to develop in Orthodox contexts.A ll this is particularly conducivet ot he emergence of Orthodox rigorism.
In ordert ob etterc apture the specificities of Orthodox Christianity and its multiple repercussions,o ne must take into consideration the fundamental fact that its encounterand relationship with modernity -incontrast to West European 99 See Makrides 2003, pp.211-215. Christianity-were partial, fragmented, limited and incomplete.Itthus never had the consequences that were made possible in the West, adevelopment that in the long run changed the profiles of the respective churches there. 100 This concerns a variety of key issues that have shapedm odernc ultural values,r anging from individual human rights and personal autonomy to liberal, pluralist and secular ideals.Orthodox Churches,however,still have great problems copingwith these developments,s imply because they have never experienced the processes and changes that led to them in af ull and constructive way.T he post-communist Russian Church with its current critique of the basic tenets of Western modernity including individual human rights is ac lear case in point. 101 Thes ame concerns other Orthodox milieus in post-communist times as well 102 ,such as Georgia 103 and Romania 104 .Interestingly enough, similar problems can also be observedinOrthodoxGreece,acountry that always belonged to the Western orbit of influence. In general, the Orthodox discoursestill shows certain clear predilectionsthat are closely related to the lack of aproductive encounter with modernity.Asaresult, it often tries to answer or solve modern problems and challenges by reference to a pre-modernlogic and frame of ideas,based on the authorities of the past (Church Fathers etc.). By contrast, all this may explain why West EuropeanC hristianity exhibits otherf acets.I thas alreadyh ad along and painful,yet constructive encounter with modernity;f or example, with the Enlightenment, which led to its greaterr ationalization and secularization. This also explainsw hy we do not commonly find strong fundamentalist movements on the West European religious scene contraryt ot he USA,w here the impact of the Enlightenment was quite ad ifferent one.A na bsence of the Enlightenment influence can also be claimedf or OrthodoxE astern and South EasternE urope, 105 which may also account for severalofits religious and cultural idiosyncrasies including rigorism.
It is in thiscontext that Orthodox rigorists may expectedly not only exist and survive,but also sometimes thrive and flourish.The whole Orthodox environment is hence conducive to their genesis and rise in the first place,e specially as they tend to be more extreme in their critical stancetowards, or negationof, modernity and of the spirit underlying it. In many respects,they represent pretty well what Olivier Roy has called "holy ignorance"
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.This is because their understanding of the Orthodox tradition is reductionist, fragmenteda nd lacks the sophistication and the criticala wareness induced by soundh istorical analysis,m odern con-textualthinking and the ability for self-reflection. 107 They sense the need to objectify their beliefsinsuch away as to feel absolutely secure and to cast awayany external influences or criticalviews. Forthem, to believe,even blindly and dogmatically,i sf ar more important than to try to know better. Fore xample,t heir attachment to the Bible and other authoritative texts of OrthodoxChristianity or to the Church Fathers is uncritical, mythical, and credulous.
108 Modern hermeneutics or other methods of examining past texts and their heritage (e.g.t he historical-critical one) are practically unknown in rigorist milieus.T hey usually speak of the incomparable value and significance of the Orthodoxtradition as a taboo,yet they basically "ignore" how this tradition came about, what exactly it contains,and how it should be interpretedtoday.All this is,however, of no interest to them,asthis mostly irrational, instinctual, and naïve adherence to what they consider as "sacred" conveys to them certainty,security and confidence.Itgoes without saying that this attituder eflects the traditionalO rthodox anti-intellectualism,which is expressed in numerousforms (e.g.asacritique of modern academic theology
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). Does all this mean that rigorism goes unchallenged and gets no response or critique at all within Orthodoxcontexts?Infact, the oppositeisthe case.First, the church hierarchy,e ither officially or through its individual members,o ften denounces the rigoristv iews,actions and excesses as deviating from, or as not expressing, the genuine Orthodoxt radition.T his is because rigorist activities in many cases do not please the official church, as they may be outspokenly directed againsti t. On the other hand, as already mentioned, the church may use and instrumentalize rigorists for various purposes,and there are church hierarchs who are close to the rigorists and theirperceptions while supporting them. This ambivalent attitude complicates the whole situation and explainswhy such official church critique against the rigorists does not bear fruits and remains mostly ineffective.
More substantial critique againstr igorism originates from other Orthodox milieus,n amely from independent clerics, lay theologians and othert hinkers dealingw ith Orthodox Christianity,w ho are in ab etter position to realize the problems createdb yr igorism and attempt to find wayst on eutralize this phenomenon. This is attempted not only in the historical Orthodox heartlands,b ut also in the Orthodox diasporic communities,asmany Orthodox there can make pertinent comparisons between Orthodox rigorism and other forms of fundamentalism. Here the need to avoid extreme positions and to follow ar ather middle and reasonable way is mostly emphasized. This can be basically accom-plished through amoderately criticalview on tradition, as the danger to fall into an arid traditionalism remains alwaysi mminent. Seminal Orthodoxt heological thinkers of the 20 th centuryare also adduced to show how one should deal with tradition constructivelyand creatively and not follow it blindly. 110 In addition, the involvement of the Orthodox Churches in the broader EcumenicalM ovement exhibits numerous positive and constructive sides, which clearly speakagainst the anti-Ecumenism of the rigorists and of certain church circles. In fact, the Orthodox Churches historically contributed alot to the Ecumenical Movement during the 20 th century and in many cases played ap ioneering role. 111 Despite various problems and anti-Ecumenical reactionsi np ost-communist times,m ost Orthodox Churches are still actively involved in numerous related endeavorsa nd accomplish ag reat deal internationally.D uringv ariousc onsultations (e.g.a tt he Pan-Orthodox ConferenceinThessaloniki, 29 April -1May1998) it has also been clearly emphasized that the eventual official Orthodox dissatisfaction with some developments within the EcumenicalMovement should not be confused with the criticism exerted on it by various Orthodox rigorists,g iven that these two have quite different causes,orientations and purposes.
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In most times,the critique against rigorismisarticulated in abroader frame, namelybyindicating and emphasizingthe pressing need for the OrthodoxChurch to come to terms in moreconstructive ways with the heritage of modernity.Itis well-known that this is along and also painfulprocess,asit involves considerable changes and an outspoken reform mentality.A saresult, it cannot take place automatically, and judging from the already strong reactions to such ak ind of Orthodox reform thinking, it will not be an easy task withoutconflicts.Y et, it is more than clear that any meaningful opposition to rigorism is closelyconnected with such broaderself-critical developments within the Orthodox world. In away, the Orthodox should learn fromthe Protestant and Roman Catholic experiences with modernity and formulate their own agenda and strategy of dealingwith it. They also have to overcometheir tenacious and arid anti-Westernism and look for ways of amore fruitful encounterwith the West and its historicalheritage (e.g.the Enlightenment tradition).Asalready mentioned, thereare many signs that such fermentations in variousf orms are taking place within the Orthodox world of today,even at the official church level. Such is the case of the Volos Academy for Theological Studies in Greece,aprogressive forum of theological reflection in close relationship with the surrounding secular culture under the aegis of the local diocese.
113 But again this specific endeavorhas encountered quite afew reactions and negativec riticisms,n ot only from the rigorist camp,b ut also from certain traditionalist church hierarchs and other Orthodox actors.Itbecomesthen clear 110 See Plekon 2010; Kattan 2015 . 111 See Kalaitzidis et al. 2014 . 112 See Makrides 2004 , p. 518. 113 See Kalaitzidis 2015 that Orthodox Christianity still exhibitss trong and widespread conservative predilectionsand leanings that may inhibit real reformstotake place.Bethat as it may,weare still at the beginningofalong-termprocess that willpossibly enable the emergence of anew and reformed Orthodox world in the future.
Generally,church leaders tend to underestimate the importance of rigorismor to disqualify it as aforeignintruder into the pristine Orthodox tradition and as an ineffective strategy in the modern global environment. 114 At the same time,they try to control its bearers and soften their extremism, so that they may use them for variouspurposes.Inthis article,however, the main goal was not so much to locate foreign influencesupon Orthodox rigorism, such as from Protestant fundamentalism,but rather to assess its presence in its real dimensionswithin the broader Orthodox landscape by analyzingi ts mainm anifestations,s ocio-cultural backgrounda nd evolution, as well as its ambivalent relationsw ith the church hierarchy.Bearing all this in mind, it is likelythat the particular coexistence between the official church and the rigorists will continue in the years to come,together with the phases of their collaboration,aswell as of their conflict. In all probability, rigorists will not gain controlo ft he official church in the near future,b ut the pressure that they may exert on it will certainly continuetobeaserious factor in shapingfuture church politics.Nodoubt, the ongoingglobalization process and its further implementation willhave far-reaching consequences for Orthodox local identities and will probably exacerbate even stronger rigorist reactions.This may lead to unexpected alliances among the opponents of globalization,regardless if they originate from quite diverse backgrounds.From this point of view,itmakes little sense if one classifies Orthodoxrigorists,Protestant fundamentalists and all similarly-minded groupsi nasimplistic way as irrational fanatics and threats to world stability.A side from the conflicts and polarizations producedb ys uch protest movements,itismore interestingtoassess their open and patent role in societyand how they are linked to the establishments,both religious and secular, that they most vehemently criticize.Such an antinomy can be clearly observed, as alreadym entioned, on the Holy Mountain Athos,w here this traditionally antiWestern monastic community receivest oday large amounts of money from the European Union for restoration and modernization works;aprocess that,however,threatens to alter substantially its time-honored image.Itisalso exciting to examine what makess uch conservative movements like rigorism appealing, attractive and quite successful among many categoriesofpeople,sometimes in clear opposition to various liberal, progressive and trendier religious groups. 115 In our specific case,the previously analyzed endogenous causesfor the genesis and the development of Orthodoxrigorism may account for this.
No doubt,Orthodox rigorismappears to be at times vehemently anti-modern and anti-Western, yet at the same time it deals with modernity in its own manner. 114 See Papandreou 2000 , pp.245-251. 115 See Kelley 1972 
